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MALINGERER OR MALIGNED: A COMPARATIVE




I live in pain from Multiple Chemical Sensitivities with burning skin and
sinuses and lungs and aching teeth and numbing of my face with
eventual anaphylaxis. What I would like others to know is this: when you
have been informed that scented products cause pain to others, believe
them. This is not a dreamed up control tactic, it is real. Please don't say
to me, "Well it didn't bother you last time. " Every interaction requires
we endure a level of pain. Each moment brings a different mix of
chemicals, some easier to manage than others. I try to endure for the
sake of being in the company offamily and friends and being employed
- Jo-Anne l
Jo-Anne describes what it is like for her to live with multiple chemical
sensitivities ("MCS"). It is a life not only marred by illness, but also marred
by suspicion. People with MCS must live with the daily fear of having an
adverse reaction to any number of chemicals we all use in everyday life.2
Because these are chemicals many of us come in contact with regularly
without any kind of unusual response, the person with MCS is often viewed
as the paradigmatic hypochondriac. She is either cast as the malingerer who
feigns ill health for personal benefit or she is seen as self-deluded in her
suffering.3 In some ways, these stereotypes can be understood as symptoms
of our society's attitudes toward disability, particularly those that are
f Ph.D candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School; Sessional Assistant Professor, University of
Victoria, 2014; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 2013 as a James Kent Scholar; J.D., University of
Ottawa, 2011; B. Jour., Ryerson University, 2003. I am grateful for the support, encouragement, and
editing suggestions provided to me by Elizabeth Emens, Isidor, and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law
at Columbia Law School, and David Lepofsky, Canadian lawyer and disability rights advocate. I would
also like to thank Estelle Hjertaas for her insight. Finally, I am thankful to the reviewers of this Article
for their very constructive comments A version of this Article was presented at the annual meeting of
the Society for Disability Studies on June 14, 2014 in Minneapolis, MN.
1. The above comment was made on May 10, 2011 and appears below a blog post. Lindsay
Coulter, David Suzuki Foundation, Be Sensitive to Those with Environmental Sensitivities, QUEEN OF
GREEN (May 9, 2011), http://www.davidsuzuki.org/blogs/queen-of-green.
2. For more discussion about the definition, symptoms, and triggers of MCS, please see Part II.A.
3. I use the pronoun "she" because women make up the vast majority of people with MCS. See
infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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invisible. Because MCS is a relatively new and contested illness, skepticism
of the diagnosis expresses itself not only in the everyday judgments Jo-
Anne describes, but also in the judgments of courts and tribunals.
Using MCS as an example, the overarching objective of this Article is
to examine and compare disability law in Canada and the United States to
better understand how disability is defined and then accommodated in the
realm of employment discrimination. Examining the law in these two
jurisdictions through an MCS prism provides some unique insights. MCS is
an invisible disability and it remains a contested illness. 4 And, because we
cannot see that a person has MCS in the same way we can see that a person
uses a wheelchair, for example, there may be additional cognitive obstacles
that stand in the way of our ability to understand the disability that results.
MCS is also a condition that implicates society in a unique way. If we
adopt the dominant social approach to disability-that is to say that we see
socially constructed environments and attitudes as the root cause of
disablement as opposed to an individual's medical condition-then MCS
presents us with a unique opportunity for self-examination. Effective
accommodation of MCS ideally requires widespread social awareness and
change.' It would have us modify our behavior on both an institutional and
an individual level. Practices and habits related to everything from how we
construct our built environment, to the products we buy and consume, to
how we clean our homes and workplaces, to our morning grooming rituals
are implicated.6 Because of this, an examination of MCS case law has the
potential to reveal how far our law, as a social institution, is willing to go to
accommodate someone who is disabled.7
Employment is also an important site for analysis, particularly in a
capitalist society. In part, this is because of the importance of work to our
4. See the discussion in Part II.A and Part II.B.
5. For information on accommodations and best practices in Canada, see CARA WILKIE & DAVID
BAKER, CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ACCOMMODATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
SENSITIVITIES: LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 28-31 (2007).
6. It should be noted here that this Article does not attempt to address the issue of third-party
accommodation and disability and any conflicting rights that may result. While an employee with MCS
may make a claim against an employer for accommodation, other parties may also have some
responsibility in ensuring that a workplace is safe. For example, third parties in a workplace context
could include coworkers, clients, customers, etc. This topic is ripe for legal exploration. For the purpose
of this Article, it is safe to assume that third parties may currently be under more moral obligations
rather than legal ones and that the author favors accommodation over convenience or consumer
preference in most cases.
7. I chose to use the word "disabled" here and not person-first terminology because I believe that
disability, for the most part, is a socially constructed phenomenon. As well, the passive verb "disabled"
is used m an effort to invite questions of social hierarchy and dominance. As Sheila McIntyre points out,
by using such language "the focus shifts from debates about appropriate comparators to analysis of
relations between excluders and the excluded, stigmatizers and stigmatized, expropriator and
dispossessed." Sheila McIntyre, Answering the Siren Call ofAbstract Formalism with the Subjects and
Verbs of Domination, in MAKING EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL: SECURING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY UNDER
THE CHARTER 99, 103 (Fay Faraday et al. eds., 2009).
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economic well-being; but also, because our jobs define us. As Vicki Schultz
argues in her essay, Life's Work, paid employment forms the foundation for
equal social citizenship, provides a means for community contribution and
membership, and allows for the formation of identity and aspirations.8
Thus, the workplace becomes an important place for us to demonstrate our
collective responsiveness to disability.
The goal of this Article is to use MCS legal claims as a way to
compare U.S. and Canadian employment discrimination law to better
understand how an invisible, controversial disability is regarded in each
jurisdiction. Isolating the focus to a contested illness helps shed light on the
nuances at play in terms of how disability is defined in each jurisdiction and
how these definitions are actually applied to the lived experiences of
disabled workers. This brief study reveals that courts and tribunals in both
countries demonstrate disbelief about what it means to live with MCS
making it difficult for people with the condition to be heard and
accommodated. While the limited statistics demonstrate that claims are
more likely to succeed in Canada, it appears that it is actually the U.S.
system that is currently advancing in terms of valuing the experiential
knowledge of MCS plaintiffs.
Part II provides some background information on the history and
controversy of the MCS diagnosis and explains why this illness should be
considered as a class of disability. Part III briefly sets out the relevant
employment discrimination law in the United States and Canada and then
provides an analysis of the MCS case law in each jurisdiction with
particular attention to common themes found in the decisions concerning
issues of credibility, prioritization of scientific evidence, and the
exaggeration of disability. Part IV compares the results of the case law in
each country and demonstrates that, while U.S. plaintiffs have traditionally
been disadvantaged, recent changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act
may have a significant impact in widening the definition of disability. The
discussion then moves on to consider why MCS cases are so challenging to
establish and whether there is room for change. Finally, the Article
concludes by pointing to a need for legal analysis that increases reliance on
experiential knowledge and an understanding of what it means to live with
MCS as opposed to scientific skepticism as a way forward. By doing this,
the law will be more responsive to the needs of people impacted by ever
new and evolving health conditions.
8. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000).
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II. UNDERSTANDING MCS
It is important to know something about MCS as an illness and its
history in order to understand the legal responses to employees with the
condition. Below is a brief description of the medical diagnosis followed by
some discussion about the recognition of MCS as a disability. This
information serves as a frame for the rest of the discussion.
A. What Is MCS?
MCS is regarded as an emerging illness and one that still lacks medical
explanation. 9 The illness's etiology is controversial and the medical
diagnosis is still contested.1° That said, there is a consensus about what it
entails. 11 In general terms, MCS is a chronic condition in which a person's
exposure to small amounts of chemicals-usually doses that would
otherwise be undetectable by many people-triggers an adverse,
multisystem reaction. MCS is just one of a number of conditions that are
considered under the umbrella of "environmental sensitivities.,'
12
The experience of MCS varies widely among individuals impacted.
Different people experience different reactions to different chemicals and
with different degrees of sensitivity to exposure. The nature, duration, and
severity of a person's reaction to a chemical trigger vary and may include
difficulty breathing, palpitations, digestive problems, skin rashes,
headaches, dizziness, depressed mood, memory loss, joint and muscle pain,
fatigue, weakness, and sensations of numbness or tingling. 13 All of these
symptoms, depending on their severity, may interfere with a person's
ability to do many daily activities, including work. 14
9. Statistics Canada lists MCS as one of a number of conditions with "medically unexplained
physical symptoms," or "MUPS" for short. Jungwee Park & Sarah Knudson, Statistics Canada,
Medically Unexplained Physical Symptoms, HEALTH REPORTS, Feb. 2007, at 43.
10. Randall M. Packard et al., explain that the "emergence" and acceptance of new illnesses
involves both "an epidemiological phenomenon and a social process." As they note, both arenas are
fraught with politics, often related to the class of people affected by the illness. Randall M. Packard et
al., Introduction- Emerging Illness as Social Process, in EMERGING ILLNESSES AND SOCIETY:
NEGOTIATING THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENDA 1, 2 (Randall M. Packard et al. eds., 2004).
11. According to a 1999 consensus definition, there are six criteria for diagnosis: (1) The
symptoms are reproducible with repeated chemical exposure; (2) The condition is chronic; (3) Low
levels of exposure result in symptoms; (4) The symptoms improve or resolve when the triggenng
substance is removed; (5) Responses occur to multiple chemically unrelated substances; and (6)
Symptoms involve multiple organ systems. Multiple Chemical Sensitivity: A 1999 Consensus, ARCH.
ENVTL. HEALTH, May/June 1999, at 147.
12. MARGARET E. SEARS, CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL SENSITIVITIES 3 (2007).
13. Park & Knudson, supra note 9, at 43; Michael K. Magill & Anthony Suruda, Multiple
Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome, 58 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 721 (1998); Courtney V. Vierstra et al.,
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and Workplace Discrimination: The National EEOC ADA Research
Project, 28 WORK 391, 392 (2007).
14. Magill & Suruda, supra note 13.
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The list of possible triggering agents is very long and includes
chemicals used in many everyday items. For example, scents appear to be a
common trigger and turn up in personal care products like perfume,
aftershave, shampoo, soap, body lotion, and even laundry detergent. Other
culprits include various household cleaners, solvents, paint, new carpets,
new computer equipment, pesticides, some foods, cigarette smoke, car
exhaust, mold, and even electromagnet fields.15 Again, experiences vary
and a reaction to one trigger does not necessarily mean a reaction to
another.
Regarding prevalence, the American and Canadian statistics
concerning MCS medical diagnosis rates are fairly consistent. The U.S.
numbers range from anywhere between 1.9% (New Mexico) to 6.3%
(California). 16 In Canada, 2.4% of people over the age of twelve, and 2.9%
of people over the age of thirty report a diagnosis.1 7 Women are
disproportionately diagnosed, with one report noting that as many as 85%
to 90% of MCS patients are women.1 8 The onset of symptoms usually
occurs during the most productive working years of a person's life, between
the ages of thirty to fifty. 19 It is also important to consider that studies
focusing on rates of medical diagnoses may not accurately reflect the extent
of the illness if people who have mild forms chose not to seek medical
attention.2 °
The genesis of the contemporary understanding of MCS is largely
credited to the work of Chicago doctor Theron Randolph in the 1940s and
1950s.2 1 While the condition has been known by a number of different
names, 22 it was finally labeled Multiple Chemical Sensitivity in 1987 and
15. For a more detailed list of triggers by type, see SEARS, supra note 12, at 16-17.
16. When asked more generally about allergies or unusual sensitivities to chemicals, the numbers
jumped to 17% and 15.9% in the respective studies. A summary of a number of these state studies from
the late 1990s can be found in Albert H. Donnay, On the Recognition of Multiple Chemical Sensitivity in
Medical Literature and Government Policy, 18 INT'L J. TOXICOLOGY 383 (1999). A more recent study
conducted in Georgia found that 3.1% of respondents reported a diagnosis and 12.6% reported
hypersensitivity. Stanley M. Caress & Anne C. Steinemann, Prevalence of Multiple Chemical
Sensitivities: A Population-Based Study in the Southeastern United States, 95 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 746
(2004).
17. Park & Knudson, supra note 9, at 44; Statistics Canada, Health Division, How Healthy are
Canadians?, HEALTH REPORTS, Feb. 2006 (supplement to vol. 16), at 24.
18. Magill & Suruda, supra note 13.
19. Id.; Vierstra et al., supra note 13, at 392.
20. SEARS, supra note 12, at 4.
21. Donnay traces the history of MCS from the 1800s to late 1990s. See supra note 16. An account
of the history can also be found in Ruby Afram, New Diagnoses and the ADA: A Case study of
Fibromyalgia and Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 85, 99-105
(2004).
22. See, eg., Magill & Suruda, supra note 13 (Other names for MCS and related conditions
include terms such as "chemical AIDS, 20th century disease, total allergy syndrome, sick building
syndrome, chemophobia, immune dysregulation.").
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given formal definitional criteria.2 3 The medical community was divided
about the scientific validity of the MCS diagnosis. In a 1989 position paper,
the American College of Physicians questioned the practice of clinical
ecology and the validity of MCS as a diagnosis by extension.24
A turning point came after the Gulf War. Military troops were
returning from the Middle East with mysterious health problems, similar to
MCS, that many believed were the result of exposure to chemicals during
Desert Storm.25 Veterans' groups were able to use political clout to get their
health concerns onto the public health agenda and push for a recognized
diagnosis.26 A resulting shift came in the form of validation from
organizations like the American Medical Association that were suddenly
willing to say that MCS was not simply a psychological disorder.27
The debate about whether, and to what extent, MCS is a psychological
or psychiatric condition persists.2 Canadian disability rights advocates
caution that this "scientific confusion" can lead to social stigma and, in
turn, denial of accommodation when a person is told that "[MCS] is in their
head., 29 Regardless of the cause, it is clear that people who have MCS
experience very real, physical symptoms as a result of environmental
triggers.30
B. MCS as a Disability
The question of definition is a central consideration when it comes to
determining disability, particularly in a legal context. How we understand
whether a particular impairment is actually disabling is socially and
culturally specific. Beyond that, legal definitions of disability determine
who may be able to access entitlements like social assistance, disability
leave, or workers' compensation, to name a few. 31 Definitions vary from
one legislative scheme to the next and typically are inversely related to the
23. Donnay, supra note 16. Two years earlier, in Canada, a provincial government report was
issued on "environmental hypersensitivity" that also proposed diagnostic criteria and recognized that the
diagnosis had "validity." ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL HYPERSENSITIVITY DISORDERS 228, 238 (1985).
24. Clinical Ecology, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 168 (1989).
25. Afram, supra note 21, at 102.
26. Packard et al., supra note 10, at 21; see also Stephen Zavestoski et al., Patient Activism and the
Struggle for Diagnosis: Gulf War Illnesses and Other Medically Unexplained Physical Symptoms in the
US, 58 SOC. SCI. MED. 161 (2004).
27. Afram, supra note 21, at 102.
28. See, e.g., Jason W. Busse et al., Managing Environmental Sensitivity: An Overview Illustrated
with a Case Report, 52 J. CAN. CHIROPR. ASS'N 88 (2008); but see Mariko Saito et al., Symptom Profile
of Multiple Chemical Sensitivity in Actual Life, 67 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 318 (2005).
29. WILKIE & BAKER, supra note 5, at 8.
30. Id.
31. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY 11 (1996).
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resources at stake. In other words, criteria are narrower when the expenses
are potentially greater and broader when there are fewer anticipated costs.
Rights legislation falls on the broader end of the spectrum.
32
As Part III demonstrates, MCS may meet the definition of disability in
an employment discrimination context under the law in both jurisdictions
examined here.33 Beyond the law, it is also important to articulate why an
invisible health condition fits within the rubric of disability.
In Unhealthy Disabled. Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities,
Susan Wendell explains the objections some people have to grouping
together people who are chronically ill with people who have physical or
functional limitations but are otherwise healthy.34 Wendell notes, for
example, that considering people with chronic illnesses as disabled risks the
medicalization of disability as a class, a move that is perceived to displace
the social model of disability. 35 She also points out that the "unhealthy
disabled," her term for those people with chronic illnesses, may experience
fluctuations in health and impairments and are often able to pass as
nondisabled. In combination, these aspects of illness may lead to suspicion
that a person is not truly disabled or is responsible for their own condition.36
Indeed, there may be some tendency resulting from the social model of
disability for the creation of a group ethos that marginalizes those people
who are not visibly impaired.37
Under the social model of disability, it is generally understood that
disablement is the result of society's responses to a person's impairments. It
is this conception that is echoed in international law and definitions of
disability.38 The World Health Organization also views disability as the
"outcomes of interactions between health conditions (diseases, disorders
32. A.J. WITHERS, DISABILITY POLITICS & THEORY 110 (2012) (comparing definitions related to
accessibility, antidiscrimination, and social assistance legislation in both Canada and the United States).
33. Again, it is important to note that this Article, as set out in the main text, only deals with the
definition of disability as it relates to employment discrimination. Statutory schemes for other
entitlements such as social assistance, for example, have different definitional criteria. See, e.g.,
Cleveland v. Pol'y Mgmt. Syst. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (Definitions concerning if a person is work
qualified versus social security qualified are different tests.).
34. Susan Wendell, Unhealthy Disabled: Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities, HAPATIA, Fall
2001, at 17.
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id. at 28-29.
37. Jill C. Humphrey, Researching Disability Politics, Or, Some Problems with the Social Model
in Practice, DISABILITY & SOCIETY, Jan. 2000, at 67. In contrast, Tobin Siebers, viewed the shared
experiences of pain, in an epistemological sense, as creating a unified class of disabled persons. Tobin
Siebers, Disability and the Pain of Minority Identity (unpublished manuscript at 7) (on file with author).
38. For example, the United Nations regards disability as relational by "[r]ecognizing that
disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with
others." Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A.Res. 61/106, U.N. GAOR, 61st
Sess. Supp. No.49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106/Annex II, at 65 (Dec. 13 2006).
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and injuries) and contextual factors," including social attitudes and the built
environment.
39
This framework makes it clear that a person with MCS is disabled by
virtue of the fact that adverse reactions to chemicals in her environment
impair her ability to work and otherwise live, and are disabling where the
chemical trigger is not managed regardless of whether or not her disability
is visible or readily apparent to others. This also means that the actual
diagnosis or label for the condition is not as important as its effect on the
person impacted. Meeting the legal definition of disabled in an employment
discrimination context is not as straightforward.
III. JUDGING MCS
In some ways, comparing case law between the two jurisdictions is
very much an exercise in comparing apples and oranges and some critics
may argue that there is little to be gained from the exercise. By focusing on
MCS as a single disability, I have attempted to limit the variables to provide
a useful contrast.
While the United States and Canada are both common law countries,
the law in each nation has evolved differently to reflect particular culture
and values. Very generally, both jurisdictions require that a plaintiff-in
Canada a complainant or grievor-first make out a prima facie case by
demonstrating that she is disabled under the relevant law and faces
discrimination as a result. An employer may then attempt to justify the
discrimination by showing accommodation is not feasible because of things
like essential qualifications for the job or undue hardship. The similarity
between the frameworks, however, ends there.
Additionally, it is important to understand that using case law to
determine the actual social conditions of disability discrimination in
employment is problematic. This is for two reasons inherent in studies of
civil or human rights cases. First, many disputes are resolved without resort
to litigation including through mechanisms provided by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in the United States or
human rights commissions in most Canadian jurisdictions. This means that
any statistics related to case law only portray part of the issue and leave out
all of the claims that have been resolved without resort to formal
mechanisms. 40 Conversely, negative outcomes for plaintiffs may not be
39. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TOWARDS A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR FUNCTIONING,
DISABILITY AND HEALTH: ICF 10 (2002) (emphasis in original).
40. 1 thank Canadian lawyer and disability rights advocate David Lepofsky for this important
observation.
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reported with the same frequency as decisions in their favor. 41 Putting that
aside, the purpose of this Article is to examine the existing legal analysis as
a framework for attempting to grapple with wider social understandings of
disability in general and MCS in particular. The actual numbers are less
important.
For each country, and with the above in mind, I set out some basic
information concerning the legal landscape followed by analysis of the
available and relevant MCS case law.
A. The U.S. Context: Statutory Definitions and Tort-Style Litigation
1. The Legal Framework
Disabled employees in private and public sector workplaces may
pursue recourse against discrimination under Title I or Title II, respectively,
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 42 Federal employees and
contractors may also make claims under the Rehabilitation Act,43 which
uses the same standards as the ADA to determine discrimination. 44 The
American legislation requires reasonable accommodation of disability and
an employer's failure to meet this duty is considered discriminatory.4 5
A three-prong definition of disability is set out in the ADA:
(1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities of such individual;
(2) a record of such an impairment,46 or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment.47
Disability is assessed under this definition by the courts on a case-by-
case basis and turns on a number of factors, including whether a plaintiff
can demonstrate substantial impairment of a major life activity and if this
limits her ability to work in a broad class of jobs or perform the essential
functions of her position. A plaintiff bears the onus, not only for
demonstrating disability, but also proving that she can be reasonably
accommodated. 48 There is no list of conditions that automatically or
41. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act. A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99 (1999).
42. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq. (1990) [hereinafter ADA].
43. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. (1973).
44. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321 (11 th Cir. Fla. 2005) (The standard for determining liability
under the Rehabilitation Act is the same as that under the ADA.).
45. ADA, 42 U.S.C., § 12112.
46. Because MCS is a new and contentious diagnosis, it has been noted by the U.S. courts that a
claimant may have difficultly establishing disability based on the record of disability prong under the
ADA. See Gits v. 3M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20871 (D. Minn., June 15, 2001).
47. ADA, 42 U.S.C., § 12101.
48. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). After a plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case, an employer defendant may then try to prove that the employee cannot be accommodated without
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exclusively qualify under the definition and no requirement for an actual
diagnosis. 49 This is an especially important point to consider when the
disability is not readily apparent and the medical science is controversial.
How the courts continue to apply the ADA is currently in a state of
flux. 50 This is because interpretation of the original statute had become
increasingly restricted. Court holdings gradually moved toward very narrow
readings of the definition meaning that fewer and fewer people qualified for
protection under the legislation. Most notably, two decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court made it much more difficult to demonstrate an impairment,
and thus be considered disabled, by limiting what could be considered a
major life activity and requiring that the use of mitigating measures-such
as assistive devices or mobility aids, for example-be part of the analysis.5
The definition of disability became so limited that Congress stepped in and
seemingly admonished the courts by passing the ADA Amendments Act
("ADAAA"), changing the definitional criteria with the express aim of
restoring broader coverage. 2 Because the changes to the Act are so recent
and the newly expanded definition of disability does not apply retroactively,
there is insufficient case law to assess the overall impact of the
amendments. Only one of the MCS cases listed below is a post-ADAAA
decision. 3
In general, ADA employment discrimination claims are rarely
successful. According to a 2009 article exploring employment
discrimination litigation trends from 1998 to 2006, disability claims
undue hardship, the standard for which appears at first blush to be lower than in the Canadian context.
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The employee must show that the
accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs."); Central
Okanagan Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (Can.) ("The use of the term 'undue' infers
that some hardship is acceptable.").
49. The ADA sets out a list of excluded conditions such as those related to gender and sexual
identity and the use of illegal drugs, etc. See ADA, 42 U.S.C., § 12211. It is interesting to note that Title
II Regulations, with respect to public services, does include a list of examples of accepted "physical or
mental impairment[s]" for that part of the Act. The U.S. Department of Justice declined to categorize
MCS as a disability for the purpose of this regulation. Americans with Disabilities Act Title II
Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 35 app. B (Mar. 15, 2011).
50. Following the amendments to the ADA, Elizabeth Emens calls this "a fascinating and
uncertain time for U.S. disability law." This is because it remains to be seen how higher courts will
interpret changes to the definition of disability. Emens theorizes that the courts will find new ways to
narrow the definition of disability to conform with prevailing social attitudes that characterize disability
as an individualized medical concern and accommodation as too costly. Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling
Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (2012).
51. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
52. ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325; 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). In its purpose provisions,
the ADAAA specifically refers to the Supreme Court's decisions in Toyota and Sutton as having
"narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating
protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect."
53. Feldman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Rd. of Educ., 2012 WL 3619078 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 21,
2012).
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succeed about 9.12% of the time.54 This represents the lowest success rate
out of all the categories considered.55 The statistics alone demonstrate the
high level of scrutiny disabled plaintiffs face.
2. The Case Law
The survey of U.S. case law reveals twenty-three MCS decisions.56
Using these cases, it is not possible to determine if any of the plaintiffs
ultimately succeed. This is because all of the available decisions are either
motions for summary judgment and/or motions in limine concerning the
exclusion of evidence at trial. If survival of a motion for summary judgment
is viewed as a success-or at least not an outright failure-then MCS
plaintiffs are able to proceed to trial approximately 13.5% of the time.
57
Although not the subject of the analysis here, many discrimination
claims are resolved by the EEOC without proceeding to court. A 2007 study
of confidential EEOC records compares outcomes in MCS cases against a
control group composed of claimants with various other invisible
disabilities. 58 According to their findings, MCS claimants are successful
15.7% of the time compared to a 23% success rate for the control group. 59
That said, the courts' analysis is more striking than the statistics and
arguably even more relevant given the small sample. Questions of plaintiff
credibility loom large in many of the decisions, sometimes in the shadows,
but often in the foreground. The plaintiff is either viewed as having
insufficient knowledge to speak on her own behalf, or she is a liar seeking
to deceive her employer. The cases discussed below are grouped under the
following main headings: Credibility and Malingering, Prioritization of
Scientific Evidence, and Exaggerating Extent of Disability. I then look at
what impact the ADAAA may have on future decisions.
54. Kevin M Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 117 (2009).
55. Id.
56. The survey used to gather the cases cited was des:gned to be thorough but is in no way
scientific. Relevant decisions were located using a keyword-search on Westlaw using the following
parameters: "Americans with Disabilities Act" & MCS "Multiple Chemical Sensitivities." Cases were
later added to reflect decisions under the Rehabilitation Act following the effective date of the ADA.
Additional cases found through reading of relevant literature were also added. Opinions were selected
based on the centrality of MCS as the relevant disability at issue. Rulings made on strictly procedural
grounds were also discarded. Also, please note that only some of the cases are examined below.
57. Of twenty-two cases clearly involving a motion for summary judgment, three claims were able
to proceed, and nineteen claims were terminated before advancing to trial.
58. Vierstra, et al., supra note 13 (The study compared the employment discrimination experiences
of people with MCS as an "emerging disability" to a control group, or "general disability group,"
comprised of people with allergies, asthma, HIV/AIDS, gastrointestinal impairments, cumulative trauma
disorder and tuberculosis.).
59. Id at 399.
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i. Credibility and Malingering
A number of the decisions clearly question whether the plaintiff is
telling the truth about her illness and its impact on her ability to work. The
first example can be found in the 1995 Whillock decision in which an airline
reservation agent with MCS sought accommodation by being allowed to
work from home.60  The defendant's motion for summary judgment
succeeds and the court states that, even if the accommodation requested was
reasonable, the plaintiff is not credible. In a footnote, no less, the judgment
outlines evidence advanced by the defendant that she "regularly goes
grocery shopping, visits her doctor's office, visits her mother-in-law at least
four times weekly, and goes out to eat an average of once a week." 6' Even
the fact that the plaintiff was able to participate in the court process by
attending depositions is used against her.62 We never get to hear from
Whillock about why she is able to do certain activities and not others.
Subsequent decisions also use such evidence as an opportunity to view a
plaintiff with suspicion and characterize threats to health as "unwillingness"
to work. 63
Only in one decision does the court consider evidence about how a
plaintiff manages her MCS in the course of other daily life activities. In
Davis, the employer argues that the plaintiff is not disabled because she
only experiences symptoms when working near a particular individual, and
anyway, her testimony is subjective. 64 In response, the court allows the
plaintiff to explain why she has difficulty breathing at work, yet still
manages many daily, public interactions:
Because of the nature of her alleged MCS, Davis is not always
symptomatic. The evidence demonstrates that Davis always faces the
possibility of having her breathing impaired, but that she can usually
avoid prolonged exposure to irritants outside of work. For example, she
testified in her deposition that she avoids certain stores entirely and she
60. Whillock v. Delta Air Lines Ltd., 926 F.Supp. 1555 (11 th Cir. 1996).
61. Id. at n 4.
62. Id. ("This significantly undermines Plaintiffs contention that she can be accommodated only at
home.").
63. Keck v. N.Y. State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F.Supp.2d. 194
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (The plaintiff, who was sensitive to perfume and cigarette smoke, asked to be
accommodated by working after hours. The court refers to her "unwillingness to work under certain
conditions," as opposed to her inability. It also refers to her ability to do aerobics and go hiking as
evidence that her ability to breathe was not substantially limited); Owen v. Computer Sci. Corp., 1999
WIL 43642 (D.N.J.) ("The record indicates that Owen was able to ride a bicycle ten miles to mail her
appeal of the denial of her long-term disability benefits, is able to attend church and grocery shop on a
regular basis."). It is also worth noting that there is an irony in the fact that the court in Owen does not
seem to want to hear from the plaintiff regarding her situational impairments because the decision is
cited in a survey of MCS case law as a progressive reading of the law based on the court's articulation of
the need to prioritize an individual's lived experience over scientific evidence when determining
disability. See Afram, supra note 21, at 118-20.
64. Davis v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 96 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D. Utah 2000).
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avoids certain aisles (candles, soaps, etc.) at the grocery store, wears a
mask when she cannot avoid going through the perfume area at a
department store, asks to be moved when she is seated next to someone
with strong perfume at restaurants, on airplanes, or at performances, etc.
At times, she has had to leave certain events to avoid prolonged
exposure. Thus, her alleged MCS affects her daily life, but she becomes
symptomatic usually only at work because she cannot avoid, escape, or
control her surroundings.
What the court does here is validate the plaintiff's individual
experience of impairment and give her the authority to define her disability.
Davis survives the motion for summary judgment. In part, the decision may
hinge on the fact that the people in her workplace were "surprisingly"
unwilling to yield to a simple accommodation. More significant is the fact
that Davis had opportunity to communicate the realities of her own
experience with MCS.
ii. Prioritization of Scientific Evidence
Another consistent and related theme in the U.S. case law is the
prioritization of scientific evidence over the lived experiences of plaintiffs.
As mentioned above, MCS is still a new medical diagnosis and controversy
persists. Dating back to the 1997 decision in Treadwill,66 much of the
argument in the MCS case law focuses on the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 67 In 2004, Ruby Afram examined MCS and firbromyalgia cases
to determine what impact high thresholds for the admission of expert
evidence would have on ADA cases concerning new or emerging
illnesses.68 What she found was that in MCS cases defendants have been
able to exploit such stringent evidentiary rules to the detriment of plaintiffs.
Since the publication of Afram's article in 2004, the number of motions to
exclude expert testimony regarding MCS has declined, although such a
motion was granted in a 2007 education accommodation case.69
The problem is not whether scientific evidence should be heard.
Rather, it is that the science behind the illness is taken to be more important
than the actual experience of the disability. An ironic illustration of this is
found in Coffey.70 In this case, the court rules against the use of medical
65 Id. at n.12 (emphasis in original).
66. Treadwill provides a somewhat paradoxical result in that the employer's motion limine to
exclude expert evidence on MCS succeeds, while its motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim
fails. Treadwell v. Dow-United Techs., 970 F.Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
67. The following cases are examples of instances when scientific evidence was contested via
motions in limine to exclude expert evidence. Comber v. Prologue, Inc., CIV.JFM-99-2637, 2000 WL
1481300 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000); Coffey v. Hennepin, 23 F.Supp.2d 1081 (D. Minn. 1998); Frank v.
New York, 972 F.Supp 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
68. Afram, supra note 21.
69. Kropp v. Maine Sch. Admin. Union No. 44, 471 F.Supp.2d. 175 (D. Me. 2007).
70. Coffey, 23 F.Supp.2d.
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evidence because the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that "diagnosing
MCS has progressed to a point that it is scientific knowledge capable of
assisting a fact-finder.",71 The court seems to provide an alternative means
for Coffey to demonstrate her case stressing that the "[p]laintiff herself can
testify to how she feels.",72 In the final result, the court finds against Coffey
because she has no substantial evidence "beyond her own statements., 73 It
is a catch 22 for Coffey: she must prove her case based on experiential
evidence of her own illness and impairments; and yet, she has no case with
her testimony alone. Even though scientific evidence is not able to speak to
her experiences of MCS, she is unable to win without it.
iii. Exaggerating Extent of Disability
Some of the more recent decisions accept MCS as disabling, but to an
extreme. Instead of saying that MCS cannot possibly limit the employee's
ability to work, as in the credibility cases above, the employer argues that
the condition makes it impossible for her to be employed. Again, a
plaintiffs own experiences are negated.
Dickerson, a 2011 case under the Rehabilitation Act, is a prime
example of how the extent of disability is exaggerated. 74 The plaintiff, a
nurse at a veterans' hospital in Georgia, had a series of severe reactions to
latex gloves and floor wax at work. While she was accommodated for a
period of time through reassignment to the nursing education office and she
suggested transfer to a carpeted hospital ward, the employer expressed
doubts regarding her disability and reassigned her back to her original ward.
This resulted in what might be described as a standoff: the employer forcing
the employee to work in a position she felt would endanger her health, the
employee refusing to comply even after reprimand. Dickerson was made to
obtain more and more medical evidence to prove her disability to her
employer until the medical information began to paint a picture that could
be construed as totally uncontrollable and infinitely dangerous. The
employer then terminated her. While the decision notes that Dickerson was
pressed for more medical information, the court fails to acknowledge the
degree of pressure she was under to demonstrate disability for the sake of
accommodation necessary to retain her employment in the face of her
employer's disbelief.
The decision hinges on whether Dickerson meets the defmition of a




74. Dickerson v. Peake, 2011 WL1258138 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2011), ajfd 489 F. App'x 358
(1 th Cir. 2012).
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essential functions of the job of Staff Nurse, either with or without
reasonable accommodation.",75 The court frames the issue in terms of
"whether Dickerson has identified any position that the [employer] could
assign her to in which she could escape the possibility of suffering these
debilitating reactions." 76 In granting the summary judgment, the court
writes, "Here, Dickerson is limited by her sensitivity to an indeterminate
and, by all appearances, growing list of substances. Nonetheless, her
limitations must be evaluated against the total body of medical evidence,
not just her preferred subset of substances to which she is sensitive."7
Dickerson's view that she is able to work is trumped by medical
evidence designed to make her employer take her condition seriously.
Instead, the court uses this evidence to nullify her own experiential
knowledge of life with MCS.
Moreover, while some of the medical evidence in the case speaks to
the possibility of interference with patient care, neither the employer nor the
court pursue this line of logic by advancing an argument that
accommodating her could result in a "direct threat" to anyone's health or
safety, real or perceived.78 Instead, the reasons reflect a tone that is more
paternalistic than cautionary.
This kind of paternalism does not always succeed. For example, in
Saunders,79 the defendant employer tried to argue that the plaintiff's MCS,
which was triggered by chemicals found in some kinds of paper, could be
linked to any number of other products and tried to expand the list of
triggers to things like office furniture, coworkers' perfumes, and even
money. 80 This time, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is
denied and the court finds that the "[flacts in the record could support




76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id (emphasis added).
78. Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act provide that an individual with a disability who
poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated through reasonable
accommodation in the workplace is not qualified. ADA, 42 U.S.C., § 12113(b); Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C., § 504(a). Elizabeth F. Emens explores the harm done by expanding the direct threat analysis to
instances of perceived risk in cases of mental illness in The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness,
Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399,454-55, 469 & n.304 (2006) (citing Calefv. Gillette Co.,
322 F.3d 75, 87 & n.9 (Ist Cir. 2003)).
79. Sanders v. City ofNewport, 2008 WL 2234085 (D. Or. May 30, 2008).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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iv. The ADAAA 's Impact
Only one of the MCS cases surveyed was decided following the
passage of the ADAAA. The facts in Feldman are not very compelling.82
Nor is much of the argument or analysis when compared to the cases
examined above. Simply put, Feldman left her job as a teacher and claimed
that the employer failed to accommodate her because of the presence of
perfumes and certain cleaning products at the school. The employer
succeeds on a motion for summary judgment and the court determines that
there is insufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination, hostile
environment, and failure to accommodate. What is most interesting about
the decision is that the court cites new EEOC regulations to say that neither
a diagnosis nor scientific or medical evidence is required before a court can
make a finding of discrimination based on disability and that the threshold
for proving disability is lowered in favor of scrutinizing any possible acts of
discrimination.83
The analysis in Feldman may also extend to accommodation claims.
Howard is a recent decision involving a woman diagnosed with
fibromyalgia.84 The employer moved for summary judgment arguing that
Howard does not meet the definition of disability because she is not
substantially limited in any major life activity. In ruling against the
employer, the court cites the same EEOC regulations as in Feldman noting
that the intent of the ADAAA is to "broaden the scope of disabilities
covered by the ADA.",85 The court goes on to rely on evidence provided by
the plaintiff and her husband, bolstered by medical records, showing how
fibromyalgia impacts her life. This is a promising development for people
with new or controversial illnesses because it increases the value of their
own experiential evidence.86
As noted, the above analysis considers surviving a motion for
summary judgment as a positive outcome. I found only one pre-ADAAA
case with a trial win for a plaintiff with MCS. In Muovich, the appeal court
affirms a jury trial result in favor of an elementary school teacher.87 The
82. Feldman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 3619078 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 21,
2012).
83. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R §
1630.2(j)(1)(iii), (v).
84. Howard v. Penn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3251 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013).
85. Id.
86. At least one commentator has flagged this decision as a demonstration of how the ADAAA
"makes it much easier for an employee to prevail in an ADA failure to accommodate case." ADA -
Failure To Accommodate Fibromyalgia Interpreted Broadly Under ADAAA, EMPLOYEE DISCRIMtNA-
TION REPORTER (Jan.13, 2013, 3:42PM), http://jobdiscrimination.wordpress.com. It is worth noting
here, however, that in her comparison of MCS and fibromyalgia cases, Afram found that the courts were
slightly more accepting of fibromyalgia claims. See supra note 21.
87. Muovich v. Raleigh Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 58 F. App'x. 584 (4th Cir. 2003).
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2003 decision was not noted in the analysis above because for whatever
reason the ADA claim was dropped and the claim was advanced under state
law.88 The treatment by the employer was particularly egregious and may
have made the plaintiff more sympathetic to the jury.89 Most interestingly,
when the employer objected to the admission of scientific evidence
regarding MCS, counsel for the plaintiff "agreed that MCS was not a
legitimate diagnosis," and the case was tried on the basis of a different
illness. 90 If anything, this decision demonstrates how extremely difficult it
was to ensure that the realities of MCS would be considered seriously prior
to the ADAAA.
B. The Canadian Context: Broader Definitions and Less Formal
Proceedings
1. The Legal Framework
The Canadian legal context is distinct from the U.S. context in at least
three fundamental ways. First, the legislative framework is vastly
different.9' Protection against discrimination, including the duty to
accommodate, 92 is the purview of federal and provincial human rights law.9'
88. The test under state law is sirmlar to the test under the ADA, and it was outlined by the court as
follows:
To succeed in a failure to accommodate claim under the West Virginia Human
Rights Act, Muovich was required to demonstrate that: (1) she was a qualified
person with a disability; (2) the Board was aware of her disability; (3) she required
an accommodation to perform her job; (4) a reasonable accommodation existed that
would have allowed her to perform her job; (5) the Board knew or should have
known of her needs; and (6) the Board failed to provide the accommodation.
Id.
89. For example, the school principal refused to accommodate the plaintiff and called her "nuts"
and "ridiculous." After the employee had a reaction to a particular product, the principal told a janitor to
spray the offending product in the air saying that "he'd be damned if he would change any cleaning
procedures to suit one person." Id.
90. Id. Instead of MCS, it was argued that Muovich had chemical irritant rhinosinusitis.
91. As a point of interest, Canada does not have legislation on par with the ADA. The provinces of
Ontario and Manitoba have enacted accessibility laws, but these statutes are not as comprehensive in
their scope and do not cover issues of discrimination and accommodation in employment that are still
the terrain of human rights law. See Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, S.O. 2005,
c. 11 (Can.); The Accessibility for Manitobans Act, CCSM c. AI.7 (Can.). During the 2013 election in
Nova Scotia, the Liberal Party's platform promised to "[c]reate a more accessible Nova Scotia for
persons with disabilities by appointing an Accessibility Advisory Committee with a mandate and strict
timeline to develop accessibility legislation for Nova Scotia." The election platform is available at
LIBERAL NOVA SCOTIA, https://www.liberal.ns.ca/platform/accessibility-public-transit/ (last visited on
Apr. 4, 2015).
92. Under what is known as the "unified approach" in Canada, there is no distinction between
direct and adverse effect discrimination. For this reason, the resulting impact of an employer's breach of
the duty to accommodate is considered discrimination. British Columbia (Pub. Serv. Emp. Rel.
Comm'n) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
93. It is worth nothing that discrimination on the basis of disability is also prohibited by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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There are fourteen different human rights statutes covering all provincial,
territorial, and federal jurisdictions. All of these acts prohibit discrimination
in employment on the basis of disability. Some contain detailed definitions
of disability, some very general definitions, and others no specific
definitions at all. 94 Regardless of these regional variations, the Supreme
Court of Canada ("SCC") has interpreted the coverage of these statutes to
be very broad when it comes to the meaning of disability:
The liberal and purposive method of interpretation along with the
contextual approach, which includes an analysis of the objectives of
human rights legislation, the way in which the word "handicap" and
other similar terms have been interpreted elsewhere in Canada, the
legislative history, the intention of the legislature and the other
provisions of the Charter, support a broad definition of the word
"handicap", which does not necessitate the presence of functional
limitations and which recognizes the subjective component of any
discrimination based on this ground. 95
This interpretation adheres to the Canadian approach to
antidiscrimination law by focusing on the impact of discrimination rather
than the intent.96 The law is equally unconcerned with diagnostic or other
labels. The SCC went on to reject the U.S. approach of definitional criteria
with respect to impairment and endorsed a social model of disability that
accounts for "socio-political dimensions. 97
Despite this broad interpretation, the Canadian Human Rights
Commission bolstered the protection for people with MCS in the form of a
policy recognizing environmental sensitivities:
This medical condition is a disability and those living with
environmental sensitivities are entitled to the protection of the Canadian
Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability. The Canadian Human Rights Commission will receive any
inquiry and process any complaint from any person who believes that he
or she has been discriminated against because of an environmental
sensitivity. Like others with a disability, those with environmental
sensitivities are required by law to be accommodated.
98
94. For examples of a detailed definitions of disability, see Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.
H.19, s.10(l) (Can.), in Ontario; Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 3(l) (Can.) in Nova Scotia;
and, Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5, s. 44(l)(h)(1) (Can.) in Alberta. For an example
of a general definition, see Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 25 (Can.) covering
federal employers. For an example of a statute without a definition, see Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 210 (Can.) in British Columbia.
95. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City)
and Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbnand (City),
2000 S.C.C. 27 at para. 71 (Can.).
96. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
97. Quebec v. Montreal, paras. 72-77.
98. CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, POLICY ON ENVIRONMENTAL SENSITIVITIES (2007,
rev'd Jan. 2014) available at http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/sites/default/files/policysensitivity_0.pdf
[hereinafter CHRC]. It should be noted that this policy is not binding on other tribunals. Statute and
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Second, there are slight variations in how a claim for discrimination is
made out and defended against in Canada versus the United States. Of
course, a claimant must first establish a prima facie case by showing that
there has been adverse treatment and that this treatment is related to her
disability.99 She does not need to prove the feasibility of accommodation at
this stage. 100 The onus then shifts to her employer to justify the
discrimination on the basis of a bona fide occupational requirement or to
prove that any accommodation would constitute an undue hardship.' 0
Third, because of the legislative framework in Canada,
accommodation claims are made in an administrative law context and not
via litigation in the courts.'0 2 For claims concerning accommodation in
employment, individuals may seek redress by making a human rights claim
or through labor arbitration as a union grievance.'0 3 Procedural and
evidentiary rules are less stringent in these settings than in the courts and
there is more flexibility in terms of how a case is managed and determined.
The broad definition of disability combined with the slight variance in
the doctrine and the less formal nature of adjudication in accommodation
claims may account for higher success rates in Canada. A 2007 survey of
labor arbitration cases from the provinces of Alberta, Ontario, and British
Columbia found that grievances for accommodation of disability are likely
to succeed about 41% of the time.'14
2. The Case Law
There are eleven relevant Canadian cases. 10 5 Determining wins and
losses is a trickier exercise with the labor arbitration decisions. This is
common law in Canada require labor arbitrators to apply relevant human rights legislation and
arbitrators frequently look to the field of human rights law for guidance. Parry Sound (Dist.) Soc. Servs.
Admin. Bd. v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, (2003) S.C.C. 42, para. 23 (Can.) ("[T]he substantive rights and
obligations of the Human Rights Code are incorporated into each collective agreement.").
99. Ontario Hum. Rts. Comm'n & O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (Can.);
British Columbia (Pub. Serv. Emp. Rel. Comm'n) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
100. Under Canadian law, the duty to accommodate rests primarily with the employer, who is seen
as being in the best position to determine accommodation that would not lead to undue hardship.
Obligations are also put on the complainant employee who must facilitate the search of accommodation
and accept reasonable, as opposed to ideal, measures. Central Okanagan Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Renaud,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (Can.) (citing O'Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R.).
101. Meiorin, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
102. Seneca College v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (Can.) (The Supreme Court held that human
rights legislation provides recourse for discrimination and forecloses civil actions.).
103. The onus on the parties and burden of proof required by human rights law are the same in
either setting.
104. Kelly Williams-Whitt, Impediments to Disability Accommodation, 62 INDUS. REL. 405, 410
(2007).
105. Searches were done in QuickLaw of all labor and human rights law databases for both tribunal
and court decisions using the following parameters: employ! AND ("multiple chemical" OR
environmental) /4 sensitivit! OR illness. As was done with the U.S. law, cases were selected based on
the centrality of MCS as the relevant disability at issue and rulings made on strictly procedural grounds
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because labor law is often concerned with the overarching objective of
repairing employment relationships and the forum allows for more
flexibility than in a court context. An arbitrator may apportion blame for a
failure to accommodate or rule that particular intervening events transform
an employer's duty to a disabled employee so that only partial damages are
owed. 106 For this reason, grievances allowed in part, of which there are two,
are counted here as a half win for both the employee and the employer. 107
The claimant or grievor clearly won in two of the cases surveyed, for a total
of three positive outcomes out of eleven cases or approximately 27% of the
time. 10
Again, with such a small number of cases what is more important here
is the analysis used by the adjudicators. The Canadian decisions, in general,
do allow more space for the employee's perspective, but still demonstrate
some of the same problems found in the U.S. law.
i. Credibility and Malingering
The malingerer trope is perhaps best illustrated by the multiple
decisions in Hutchinson.'0 9 Hutchinson was an environmental engineering
technician with a clean twenty-five-year record of federal government
employment." 0 She was terminated after refusing to work under conditions
she believed were unsafe because of her sensitivities to chemicals. The
decisions in this case focus on two related issues: whether the grievor's
health is in danger; and, if the parties meet their respective accommodation
duties. The question of danger arises because Hutchinson had made a
workplace safety complaint under the Canada Labour Code. "' In response,
a series of environmental tests were done and showed that the levels of
chemicals present did not pose a danger to the general population. At no
point is there any consideration of Hutchinson's particular circumstances or
her particular sensitivities. 112
were discarded. In some cases, the same parties were involved in a number of hearings. Where that was
the case, they were considered only once; that is, each claimant or greivor is counted only once for a
total of eleven.
106. Central Okanagan Sch. Dist. No. 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (Can.) (Trade unions are
also bound by the duty to accommodate.).
107. Toronto Cmty. Housing Corp. v. C.U.P.E., Local 416 (Rodriques grievance), [2009] O.L.A.A.
No. 677 (Can.); Ms. P. Grievance, infra, note 128.
108. Cyr v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Hum. Res. & Skills Dev.), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 35 (Can.);
Halidmand-Norfolk (Reg'l Health Dep't) & O.N.A. (Campbell Grievance), [1994] O.L.A.A. No. 604
(Can.).
109. Hutchinson v. Treasury Bd. (Env't Can.), [1996] C.P.S.S.R.B. No. 72; [1998] C.P S.S.R.B. No
2; [1999] C.P.S.S.R.B. No. 39; [2000] F.C.J. No. 1764; [2003] F.C.J No. 439 [hereinafter Hutchinson].
110. Id. para. 88.
111. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s. 128(l).
112. Hutchinson 1996, supra note 109.
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The question related to the duty to accommodate is somewhat
complicated by the fact that there are three separate Board decisions, each
highlighting different aspects of what accommodation was requested,
offered, or refused. The conclusion of the Board is that Hutchinson should
have applied for telework thereby casting her as uncooperative and
unwilling." 3 Only a full survey of the decisions reveals that Hutchinson
made a number of alternative requests including asking for an office as
opposed to a cubical workspace so she could control the air in the room
around her. The employer rejected that proposal, in part, because such
privileges were reserved for senior staff. 114 Again, to be fair, the picture of
who asked for what and why some forms of accommodation were refused is
not entirely clear. What is clear, is that the first decision in the matter does
not include an undue hardship analysis and fails to give an account of the
grievor's perspective concerning her impairments and needs. 115
The result of the cumulative rulings in Hutchinson's case is that she
effectively loses because of disbelief about her illness. The adjudicators
seem to take up the employer's view that if she had been truly disabled-
i.e. "sick in bed"-she would not have lost her job. 116 The reasons refer to
Hutchinson as attention seeking and unwilling to work. It concludes with
harsh judgment stating, "What we have here is a classic case of abuse of the
Code to justify not working and is a frivolous use of her rights under the
Code." 1 7 Hutchinson becomes the archetypical malingerer.
In the human rights context, the complainant in Brewer lost at the
investigation stage." 8 Just like in some of the U.S. cases, evidence that she
"[was] observed in uncontrolled public places . . . with no apparent
restrictions," is used to disprove disability without apparent opportunity for
Brewer to comment. 119
Sometimes a grievor is able to triumph in the face of disbelief about
her condition. The Cyr grievance is allowed after the employer's attempt to
end Cyr's ability to work from home. 2° In a letter to the grievor, the
employer expressed skepticism about the true nature of her disability stating
that it "was not questioning Ms. Cyr's environmental sensitivity but that
113. Hutchinson 1999, supra note 109, para. 94.
114. Hutchinson 1996, supra note 109, para. 26.
115. Id.
116. Hutchinson 1998, supra note 109, para. 41.
117. ld. para. 77.
118. Brewer v. Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, (2006) A.B.Q.B. 258, rev'd (2008) A.B.C.A. 435
(reversed on the basis of standard of review) (Can.).
119. Id. paras. 40-43. The use of this evidence is particularly distasteful considering that it was
gathered via surveillance conducted by an insurance company and not with respect to the human rights
claim. It is also worth mentioning that the judicial review decision also notes that Brewer's compliant
was not followed through with because of inappropriate emphasis on diagnosis and too much weight on
medical assessments. At paras. 29, 37.
120. Cyr v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Hum. Res. & Skills Dev.), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 35 (Can.).
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Ms. Cyr had been seen in other buildings with a mechanical ventilation
system in recent months.' 12 1 Not only is the employer found to have failed
in its duty to consult with Cyr about her needs, 122 but the adjudicator awards
damages for the expenses Cyr incurred to obtain additional medical
documentation. 123 The decision compares Cyr's invisible disability to a
visible one, stating that it is "akin to telling a sight-impaired person that one
is opposed to having a guide dog in the office.' 24 In this way, the
adjudicator's analogy does something unique by literally rendering Cyr's
invisible condition into one that is objectively visible. The comment also
underscores some of the challenges faced by people with MCS. That is, it is
not until the disability is portrayed as physical, permanent, and perceptible
that it can be comprehended as real and warranting accommodation.
ii. Prioritization of Scientific Evidence
The need for scientific and medical evidence is also apparent in
Canadian case law. In Juba, the grievor loses a claim for a reimbursement
of sick leave days taken prior to the introduction of a workplace scent-free
policy for procedural reasons. 125 The adjudicator explains why the outcome
would have been the same on the merits. In doing so, he accepts the
employer's assertion that the employee is not disabled. He acknowledges
that Juba has "sensitivity" to scents, but also that "he is not a doctor." The
adjudicator elaborates, "An occupational health and safety report essentially
establishes that no significant air quality problem existed in the workplace.
Apparently, there is no standard for scent.' ' 126 Clearly, Juba's evidence is
viewed as insufficient without medical corroboration or scientific
verification.
While the adjudicator concludes that Juba is not disabled, he goes on
to state, "From the information before me, it appears that the grievor has an
underlying condition. He suffers when he is exposed to scents. However,
scents are ubiquitous in our society[.]' 127 This remark about scents being
everywhere is important. On one level, it can be inferred from this use of
language that the adjudicator places the responsibility with the individual to
manage his "condition" and not with society to accommodate. On another
level, it may also be that the idea of managing fragrances is seen to be just
too big a problem to be dealt with in the workplace.
121. Id. para. 19.
122. Id. para. 52.
123. Id. para. 78.
124. Id. para. 70.
125. Juba v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 71 (Can.).
126. Id. para. 71.
127. Id. para. 75.
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One of the more intriguing cases is also one of the most recent. The
Ms. P. case involves a number of arbitral rulings.1 28 Ms. P. was a high
school teacher diagnosed with MCS. The case is interesting because the
employer initially seemed very willing to accommodate Ms. P. and agreed
to an accommodation plan that allowed for Ms. P. to approve of cleaning
and other products before they were used at the school where she worked. It
seems as if the agreement was untenable as the parties ended up in repeated
disputes about enforcement of the contract. It is the ninety-four-page, 2011
decision that deserves attention because of the use of dueling experts. The
union and the employer put forward opposing scientific experts. The
union's evidence is that MCS is physiological. The employer tries to prove
that it is a psychological condition and, therefore, that Ms. P. cannot
actually be accommodated.
Arbitrator Paula Knopf determines that MCS is a disability under
Canadian law regardless of which theory prevails. 1 29 But, the focus is on the
expert testimony and not the grievor's experience.
iii. Exaggerating Extent of Disability
The Ms. P. case is also about exaggerating the extent of disability in a
way that is very different form the U.S. case law. The argument this time is
not whether the grievor is in more danger than she alleges; but rather, if
MCS can be accommodated as she claims.
Arbitrator Knopf's analysis falters when she says that the conflicting
theories about MCS are relevant in determining if accommodation of Ms.
P.'s MCS is even possible. Knopf bases this on the argument that the list of
"perceived" triggers will be ever expanding, thus implying that the root of
her condition is not actually physiological. 130  She writes, "While
determination of the cause is not critical to a finding of the duty to
accommodate, consideration of the cause is important in assessing the
possibility of accommodation." 131 Ultimately, Knopf does not rule on the
question of possible accommodation and finds that it is moot following the
grievor's resignation from employment. 32 But, the mere fact that the
question is even posed is problematic because it necessitates discarding a
grievor's testimony about her lived experiences in favor of expert evidence.
128. Toronto Dist.r Sch. Bd. v. O.S.S.T.F., Dist. 12 (Ms. P. Grievance), [2008] O.L.A.A. No. 450;
[2009] O.L.A.A. No. 9; [2011] O.L.A.A. No. 461 [hereinafter Ms. P.]. Note that while three of the
decisions are cited here, the 2011 decision points out that this is the eleventh issued in the case, para. 1.
Also note that there were a number of human rights complaints but those are not considered here
because they were dismissed on procedural grounds.
129. Ms. P. 2011, supra note 128, para. 218.
130. Id. paras. 219, 223.
131. Id.para. 236.
132. Id. para. 258.
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And, depending on which side wins the debate, Ms. P. could be viewed as a
too psychologically ill to be accommodated through physical changes to her
environment.
In Campbell, a grievor with MCS and chronic fatigue syndrome was
terminated after requesting a gradual reintroduction to work following an
extended period of leave. 133 The employer argued that the grievor does not
have a disability requiring accommodation and, simultaneously, that it
"would be impossible" to accommodate her because her illnesses render her
"absolutely unable to work in any capacity. 1 34 The arbitration panel rejects
these contradictory arguments and holds that Campbell's conditions are
disabilities and that the employer must present evidence that it could not
accommodate Campbell without undue hardship. The case demonstrates
that employees with MCS inhabit a very small realm of believability and
may easily be cast as either not sick enough or too sick to work.
IV. A CROSS-BORDER COMPARISON OF MCS CASE LAW
The discussion below is divided into two parts. First, in Section A, the
MCS case law for each country is contextualized and examined
comparatively. This allows for a better understanding in terms of the
nuances between the two jurisdictions and helps to determine if one system
is better than the other for an employee with MCS. Section B raises
questions about why MCS cases are so challenging to make out, what this
means for others with contested diagnoses, and possible responses in the
tug of war between experiential testimony and scientific evidence.
A. Analyzing Outcomes
Given the case law cited above, what is most immediately apparent in
terms of differences between the two jurisdictions is that the success rate for
MCS claims in Canada is exactly twice that in the United States: 27%
versus 13.5%.135 Again, the sample size in both jurisdictions is very small.
The different forums and slight variations in the legal tests may also
account for the some of the disparity. U.S. plaintiffs must manage in a more
formal judicial context, whereas Canadians pursue claims via a flexible
system of tribunals and often with the support of labor union
representation. 36 The nations also differ in terms of how disability is
133. Halidmand-Norfolk (Reg'l Health Dep't) & O.N.A. (Campbell Grievance), [1994] O.L.A.A.
No. 604 (Can.).
134. Id. paras. 28-32.
135. See supra Parts III.A.2 & 13.2.
136. All of the favorable outcomes in Canada were in the context of labor arbitrations. This may
indicate that those people who are not unionized employees have an even lower chance of success than
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defined; although, the broader interpretation mandated by the ADAAA-as
exemplified in Feldman and Howard-may lessen the divide. 137
Impairment, rather than diagnosis, is also supposed to be the central focus
of disability-related discrimination analysis in the two countries.
Both the U.S. and Canadian cases demonstrate deep-seated skepticism
toward MCS claimants that results in a questioning of their credibility as
witnesses as well as their authority to testify about first-hand experiences of
illness. Sometimes this is overt. Other times, this is demonstrated through
an emphasis on scientific evidence at the expense of the individual's story
or a willingness to attribute a higher level of disability than the employee
herself claims. What follows is a comparison of the cases above.
The myth of the malingerer has a significant presence in decisions on
both sides of the border. This is often demonstrated by the fact that the
court or tribunal is willing to accept evidence about other activities that the
person with MCS is able to take part in without opportunity for
explanation. 138 Sometimes explanation is allowed,139 or an employer is
made to pay for making an employee disprove such assumptions.140 It is
striking that the U.S. courts seem to be nearly a decade ahead of their
Canadian counterparts in terms of challenging these kinds of arguments
from employers.
Thanks to the ADAAA, the American courts also seem to be making
advances where reliance on scientific evidence is concerned. Early MCS
cases were virtually doomed in the United States: scientific evidence was
viewed as important to proving a controversial illness and yet disallowed
for the very same reason. 14l Inherent in these cases is a presumption that
scientific evidence is paramount. Again, it seems as if the ADAAA may
lead to a significant shift with more emphasis being placed on plaintiffs'
first-hand accounts. 1
42
The role of scientific evidence in Canadian cases is currently less clear.
There are no rulings in which such evidence is deemed inadmissible
because of controversy concerning MCS. That said, there have been a
couple of 2011 rulings that either fail to recognize MCS as a disability due
their U.S. counterparts. I am, however, reluctant to make this conclusion based on such a small sample
of human rights cases.
137. Feldman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 3619078 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 21,
2012); Howard v. Penn. Dep't ofPub Welfare, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3251 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013).
138. Whillock v. Delta Air Lines Ltd., 926 F.Supp. 1555 (1lth Cir. 1996); Keck v. N.Y. State
Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F.Supp.2d. 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Owen v.
Computer Sci. Corp., 1999 WL 43642 (D.N.J.); Brewer v. Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, (2006)
A.B.Q.B. 258, rev'd (2008) A.B.C.A. 435 (reversed on the basis of standard of review) (Can.).
139. Davis v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 96 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D. Utah 2000).
140. Cyr v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Hum. Res. & Skills Dev.), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 35 (Can.).
141. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
142. Feldman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 3619078 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 21,
2012).
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to a lack of medical or scientific corroboration 43 or allow scientific debate
concerning the illness's etiology to trump a grievor's account.144 Both of
these rulings seem to contradict the broad approach to disability outlined by
the SCC 145 and the specific policy of the Canadian Human Rights
Commission recognizing environmental sensitivities as a disability. 1
46
Exaggerating the extent of disability is largely missing in the Canadian
cases. In Ms. P., there was debate concerning whether the grievor could be
accommodated but this turned on the character of the disability rather than
the extent of the impairment.147 Perhaps this is because a person in Canada
need not reach a "qualified individual" threshold in the same way that an
American plaintiff must for coverage under the ADA. 148 The decision in
Dickerson shows that this may be an area of weakness for future MCS
plaintiffs in the United States. 149 While the ADAAA appears to address
cases in which there might be insufficient scientific or medical evidence to
prove that a disability exists by deemphasizing the need for such proof, it
does nothing to address those circumstances in which a defendant argues
that a plaintiff is too disabled to be accommodated.
Interestingly, if the most recent cases are any example, it seems as if
the American courts are becoming more concerned with a plaintiff's lived
experience of MCS as a disability, 50 while Canadian tribunals are
increasingly looking for scientific and medical validation.' 5
B. Reimagining MCS Adjudication
The analysis above begs two important questions. The first is the
niggling inquiry into why MCS plaintiffs face such challenges to their
claims of impairment. The second is whether anything should be done
given these observations.
In answering the first question, it is reasonable to ask if these outcomes
really are unique to MCS employment discrimination claims. While this
Article is primarily concerned with contrasting Canadian and U.S. disability
doctrine by using MCS as an example, some authors have compared MCS
143. Juba v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 71 (Can.).
144. Ms P. 2011,supra note 128.
145. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City)
and Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City),
2000 S.C.C. 27 at para. 71 (Can.).
146. CHRC, supra note 98.
147. Ms. P. 2011,supra note 128.
148. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1990).
149. Dickerson v. Peake, 2011 WL1258138 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2011), affd 489 F. App'x 358
(11 th Cir. 2012).
150. Feldman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 3619078 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 21,
2012); Howard v. Penn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3251 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013).
151. Juba v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 71 (Can.); Ms. P.
2011, supra note 128.
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claims to other kinds of disability. The pattern that emerges is that the
former are actually less likely to succeed. 152 In particular, Ruby Afram's
2004 study of MCS versus fibromyalgia cases, mentioned above, 153 reveals
something interesting about the history of adjudicator willingness to accept
subjective accounts of disability versus scientific evidence pertaining to
contested illnesses. Her observation is as follows:
Interestingly, even in the early cases, no court rejects evidence about
fibromyalgia as an illness, and several explicitly accept fibromyalgia as
a diagnosis, or state that it qualifies as an impairment under the ADA -
even though a number of courts recognize the inherently subjective
nature ofafibromyalgia diagnosis.114
Of course, while the courts may be a little less overtly hostile to the
subjective aspects of these claims, the increased chances of success for
fibromyalgia plaintiffs as compared to MCS plaintiffs are negligible. 155
And, as demonstrated by the numbers above, all disability claims face an
uphill battle, statistically speaking.
Why these kinds of cases present such challenges for plaintiffs is open
to speculation. 156 It may be that there is an innate inability to understand the
invisible pain and suffering of others. Pain is, by its very nature,
experienced subjectively.157 Harvard professor Elaine Scarry has written
about the challenges inherent in communicating experiences of pain. She
explains that pain defies language and that the natural response to hearing
about someone else's pain is doubt.
158
It may also be that acknowledging MCS as a disability is particularly
challenging because the condition so starkly illustrates societal constructs of
disablement and, therefore, corresponding social responsibility. Recall that
in denying the discrimination claim the adjudicator in Juba points out that
"scents are ubiquitous in our society.' ' 159 Individuals are implicated for their
choices in personal grooming products, for example. Entire industries are
responsible for their use of chemicals. Widespread acknowledgment and
accommodation of MCS would be costly and require a relational analysis
152. Afram, supra note 21; Vierstra et al., supra notes 13; see supra note 58 and accompanying
text;
153. See supra Part III.A.2.ii.
154. Afram, supra note 21, at 107-08 (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Vierstra et al., incorporate a gender analysis when looking at MCS claims. They theonze that
the overall success rate of MCS claims is impacted by the gender of claimants. They base this on the fact
that most people diagnosed with MCS are women and there is research showing that doctors are less
likely to believe female complaints of pain. Thus, women are more likely to be regarded as
psychosomatic and the overall success of MCS claims is impacted. Vierstra et al., supra note 13, at 398.
157. Tobin Siebers, Disabitlity in Theory: From Social Constructionism to the New Realism of the
Body, 13 AM. LITERARY HIST. 737, 743 (2001).
158. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: TE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD (1985).
159. Juba v. Treasury Bd. (Dep't of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 P.S.L.R.B. 71, 75 (Can.).
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that is much more difficult to engage in than pity and perceiving disability
as personal tragedy. 
160
Conversely, but equally as important, is the fact that medical and
scientific evidence is not as objective as we might like to think. The
universe of illness and disability is not finite. New diseases emerge 61 just
as old ones fall in and out of favor due to changing social conceptions of
health. 162 Examples of formerly contested illnesses include conditions that
are now well recognized such as coronary heart disease, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy-also known as
mad cow disease. 163 It is estimated that at least 5% of Canadians have been
diagnosed with "medically unexplained physical symptoms," like MCS,
chronic fatigue syndrome, or fibromyalgia. 164 The number of people
impacted by new or contested illnesses will continue to grow and fluctuate.
The science behind these illnesses will also continue to evolve and change.
Given the inherently subjective nature of impairments (particularly
those associated with invisible disability), the difficulty of appreciating how
we are all implicated in disablement, and the fact that scientific knowledge
of illness is not as indisputable as we often like to think, something has to
give way. This brings us back to the second question: what is to be done?
The MCS case law appears to demonstrate an unstated presumption
against the credibility of plaintiffs with MCS on one hand, and a
presumption concerning the validity of scientific evidence on the other. A
rebalancing of sorts is needed. It is insufficient to simply say that a
diagnosis is not necessary to establish a prima facie case. Even without
requiring a diagnosis, the risk is that once a controversial condition is
labeled an evidentiary vortex forms pulling competing scientific claims into
its whirling mass. 165 Discrimination doctrine in both countries could benefit
by clearly articulating an increase in the weight accorded to experiential
evidence in disability claims.
160. See SHERENE H. RAZACK, From Pity to Respect: The Ableist Gaze and the Politics of Rescue,
in LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND
CLASSROOMS 130 (1998).
161. The World Health Organization defines an emerging disease as "one that has appeared in a
population for the first time, or that may have existed previously but is rapidly increasing in incidence or
geographic range." WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/topics/emergingdis eases/en/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
162. Jackie Leach Scully, What Is a disease? Disease, Disability and Their Definitions, 5 EMBO
REPORTS 650 (2004).
163. Anna Donald, The Words We Live In, in NARRATIVE BASED MEDICINE: DIALOGUE AND
DISCOURSE IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 17, 23 (Trisha Greenhalgh & Brian Hurwitz eds., 1998).
164. Park & Knudson, supra note 9, at 43; Zavestoski et al., adds Gulf War Illness to the list. See
supra note 26.
165. Perhaps this is why plaintiffs counsel agreed to substitute the diagnosis when pressed by the
employer in Muovich. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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The point of this Article is not that there is no place for scientific
evidence. Rather, courts and tribunals need to be able to view a plaintiff
with MCS as an expert too-one who has extensive knowledge of how the
condition impacts her body and how the actions of others are implicated in
the disability that results. Evidence from other sources, scientific or
otherwise, must focus on issues of impairment and accommodating a
plaintiffs disability. Debate about etiology or the physiological versus
psychological nature of her condition do nothing to address questions about
whether or not she experiences a reaction to a chemical trigger that
interferes with her ability to work. This, after all, is the crux of the matter.
V. CONCLUSION: MOVING THE MCS CASE LAW FORWARD
Regardless of whether a person is seeking accommodation for MCS
before a U.S. court or a Canadian tribunal, her chances of success are small.
The response to her story of illness and disability is likely to be disbelief
and cynicism. This is demonstrated throughout the case law via questions of
credibility, reliance on scientific versus experiential evidence, and the
ability to minimize the impact of the condition or blow it up to
unmanageable proportions.
If there is a theme that underlies the problem, it is that the plaintiff
with MCS is often not the person who is given the authority to account for
her actual experiences of disablement. What is needed is to find ways to do
precisely that: medical and scientific evidence must follow, not lead, a
claimant's experiential knowledge.
Prioritizing a plaintiff's testimony is not exactly a novel idea. Over the
twenty-five years since the passage of the ADA and thirty years of equality
rights under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, anti-discrimination
law in both the United States and Canada has evolved to permit an
emphasis on experiential evidence and a de-emphasis of the science. This is
clear from both the EEOC regulations 166 and Supreme Court rulings in
Canada. 167 While it appears that the Americans may be on a more promising
path following the ADAAA's re-expansion of the definition of disability,
MCS case law shows us that both jurisdictions must do more to impact
what is actually occurring in courtrooms and around tribunal tables.
Pain is a subjective phenomenon. True and lasting accommodation of
disability requires that society understand and take responsibility for our
166. ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(v) ("The comparison of an individual's performance of a major
life activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general population
usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis[.]").
167. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City)
and Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City),
2000 S.C.C. 27 at para. 71 (Can.).
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collective actions. Developments in medicine will always lag behind new
and emerging diseases. So long as the law imagines these things to be
otherwise, those people who have illnesses that are either contested or not
recognized risk being seen as malingerers, liars, or lunatics by those who
cannot see the everyday impact. 168 In a legal setting, these stigmatizing
labels may prevent their evidence from being given the consideration it
deserves. 1
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168. Donald, supra note 163, at 23 (citing ARTHUR KLEINEMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES:
SUFFERING, HEALING & THE HUMAN CONDITION (1988)).
169. WILKIE & BAKER, supra note 5, at 8.
